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APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
ESSAY
CREATING KAIROS AT THE SUPREME COURT:
SHELBY COUNTY, CITIZENS UNITED, HOBBY LOBBY,
AND THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RIGHT
MOMENTS
Linda L. Berger*
[M]yth leads people to give their attention to one
possibility rather than another, and hence to change the
direction of their intentions and their dreams. Columbus
proposed his expedition at the right time—the Kairos—
when people were ready to accept the discovery of a new
1
world.

*Linda Berger is Family Foundation Professor of Law at UNLV’s Boyd School of Law.
Thank you to Andi Orwoll for research and editorial support; to Bryn Esplin for suggesting
the study of kairos; to Teresa Godwin Phelps for illuminating this study; to Terry Pollman
and Linda Edwards for ongoing and timely conversation; to Boyd School of Law for
financial and collegial support; to Jeanne Price and the Boyd Law Library for answering
every request; to Ruth Anne Robbins for consistent encouragement and clarifying
comments; to the participants in the Applied Legal Storytelling Conference in London in
2013 and the West Coast Rhetoric Scholarship Workshop at UNLV in 2014 for their
helpful comments; and to Thomas and Michael for time well spent.
1. ROLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH 92 (1991). May credits Paul Tillich with the
translation of kairos as the “destined time.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
Kairos captures the right moment within the chronos, or the
entire sequence of moments. To realize kairos in this way, the
author must grasp the right moment in time and space.2 One
aspect of kairos is sensing the most opportune moment—what
point in time—to make a particular argument or claim. The
summer of 2015 was, for example, the right time to argue in
favor of same-sex marriage in the United States.3 The second
aspect of kairos is apprehending the essential moment—what
space in time will “stand in” for and exemplify the crux of the
problem.4 This kind of right space is exemplified by the due
process challenge that distills its argument down to the image of
the judge advising the defendant to stay away from the
courtroom in order to stay “safe from the rage of the crowd”
when the verdict is read.5
Kairos is an ancient rhetorical concept that was long
neglected by rhetorical scholars,6 and its significance to legal
2. This essay’s definition of kairos is drawn from a number of sources (cited as
appropriate), but it will differ from them in its emphasis and phrasing. The major
difference is my use of both an internal chronological timeline (within the chronos of the
problem to be solved) and an external chronos (within the often-judicial setting in which
the claim or argument is being made).
3. That the time was right is of course confirmed by the June 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Roadmap to Victory,
FREEDOM TO MARRY (n.d.), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/Roadmap-to-Victory
(noting that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), was decided after thirty-four states had
ended bans on interracial marriage, and that Obergefell was decided after thirty-seven
states had approved same-sex marriage).
4. This is similar to the use of metonymy to substitute a stand-in word or phrase for
the whole argument (for example, money as a stand-in for corporate participation in
political campaigns).
5. See infra part III(C). In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), Justice Holmes
wrote that
we must look facts in the face . . . . And when we find the judgment of the expert
on the spot [the trial judge] . . . to have been that if one juryman yielded to . . . .
reasonable doubt . . ., neither prisoner nor counsel would be safe from the rage
of the crowd, we think the presumption overwhelming that the jury responded to
the passions of the mob.
Id. at 349 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. See James L. Kinneavy, Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric in
RHETORIC AND PRAXIS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC TO PRACTICAL
REASONING 79, 80 (J.D. Moss, ed., 1986) (characterizing kairos as “neglect[ed] by many
rhetoricians, both historical and contemporary”); see also James L. Kinneavy & Catherine
R. Eskin, Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 17 WRITTEN COMMUNC’N 432, 432–33 (2000)
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argument and persuasion has been little discussed. Through their
use of two words for time, chronos and kairos, the Greeks were
able to view history as a grid of connected events spread across
a landscape punctuated by hills and valleys.7 In chronos, the
timekeeper-observer constructs a linear, measurable,
quantitative accounting of what happened. In kairos, the
participant-teller forms a more qualitative history by shaping
individual moments into crises and turning points.8 From a
rhetorical perspective, chronos is more closely allied with the
narrative accounting for—how long? what next?—while kairos
is the more metaphorical imagining as—at what point? in what
space?9
I begin with a brief overview of kairos.10 Suggesting that it
represents a quintessential judicial use of kairos, I next examine
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Frank v. Mangum, the Supreme
Court decision denying habeas relief to a Jewish factory
manager later hanged by a mob in Georgia.11 Then I discuss the
crucial lessons in kairos that can be drawn from pairing that
dissent with Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in a
seemingly indistinguishable case ten years later.12 I next
consider recent examples of kairos: first as “the most opportune
time” in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts marking a turning
point in the life of the Voting Rights Act,13 and then as “the
essential moment” in an opinion by Justice Alito expanding the
(suggesting that scholars’ failure to examine kairos in Aristotle’s work reflects general
scholarly neglect of topic); Philip Sipiora, Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos in
RHETORIC AND KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 1, 1 (Phillip Sipiora &
James S. Baumlin, eds. 2002) (noting that kairos is broader than mere timing, including
aspects of what we think of as “propriety, occasion, . . . fitness, . . . decorum, [and]
convenience,” among other concepts); John E. Smith, Time and Qualitative Time, 40 REV.
OF METAPHYSICS 3, 3 (1986).
7. See Smith, supra note 6, at 6 (noting that time conceived as chronos “furnishes an
essential grid upon which the processes of nature and of the historical order can be plotted
and to that extent understood,” but also that time conceived as kairos acknowledges that
“the chronos aspect reaches certain critical points at which a qualitative character begins to
emerge, and when there are junctures of opportunity calling for human ingenuity in
apprehending when the time is ‘right’”).
8. See Smith, supra note 6, at 4–5 (discussing kairos as a special temporal position).
9. See id. at 4 (contrasting chronos as the quantitative with kairos as the qualitative).
10. See infra part II.
11. See infra part III.
12. See infra part IV.
13. See infra part V.
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reach of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.14 The
conclusion synthesizes these themes, addressing some
advantages and limitations of kairos as rhetorical method.
II. RECOGNIZING KAIROS
Clearly recognizable after the tipping point arrives, kairos
in its sense as the most opportune moment is illustrated by the
rhetorical developments that followed Justice Scalia’s comment
in United States v. Windsor15 that there would be no turning
back the clock after the Supreme Court decision on the Defense
of Marriage Act.16 The comment became a kairic fulcrum, a
turning point for lower court judges who one after another began
to invalidate state laws prohibiting same-sex marriages.17
Similarly, Citizens United v. FEC,18 characterized by some as
having recognized free speech rights for corporations, appeared
to carve out an opening for corporations to claim that they have
the right to religious freedom and religious expression as well.19
As for kairos in the sense of capturing the essential
moment, an illustration can be found in the petitioner’s brief
filed in Miranda v. Arizona.20 Miranda had been charged with
kidnapping and raping an eighteen-year-old girl.21 According to
the brief, “[o]n March 13, 1963, defendant was arrested at his

14. See infra part VI.
15. 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
16. In dissent, Justice Scalia predicted that the ruling would extend to state statutes as
well, declaring that
[a]s far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of
listening and waiting for the other shoe.
By formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of
human decency, the majority arms well every challenger to a state law restricting
marriage to its traditional definition.
570 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. See Winning in Court, FREEDOM TO MARRY (n.d.), http://www.freedomtomarry.org
/pages/Winning-in-Court (including litigation timeline that shows a win in Massachusetts
in 2004, wins in Connecticut and Iowa in 2009, and then wins in twenty-one states between
2013 and early 2015).
18. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
19. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. Brief for Petitioner at *4, Miranda v. Ariz., 1966 WL 87732 (U.S., Jan. 19, 1966)
(No. 759).
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home and taken in custody to the police station where he was
put in a lineup consisting of four persons.”22
After being identified by two witnesses, “Miranda was then
taken to Interrogation Room 2 at the local police headquarters
and there interrogated on both [this matter and an unrelated
robbery].” Lest the reader fail to grasp the essential moment, the
brief repeats the information with more detail: “After the lineup,
it was Officer Cooley, who had arrested Miranda, who took
petitioner to Interrogation Room 2.”23 The brief points out that
no one told Miranda of his right to counsel,24 and then returns
again: “Here, Officer Cooley also testified as to interrogation in
Room 2 of the Detective Bureau, and narrated extensively a
confession he attributed to the petitioner.”25 And yet again, the
essential moment: “A written statement, obtained from Miranda
while he was under the interrogation in Room 2, was then put
into evidence.”26 And finally, the argument itself:
When Miranda walked out of Interrogation Room 2 on
March 13, 1963, his life for all practical purposes was over.
Whatever happened later was inevitable; the die had been
cast in that room at that time. There was no duress, no
brutality. Yet when Miranda finished his conversation with
Officers Cooley and Young, only the ceremonies of the law
27
remained; in any realistic sense, his case was done.

In the Miranda brief, Interrogation Room 2 became the
actual physical place within a particular moment, a kairic space
that captured the essence of Miranda’s argument: Unless the
Constitution required police to tell a criminal defendant that he
had the right to have an attorney present during his questioning,
the defendant’s Constitutional rights at trial would be virtually
meaningless. The defendant’s fate would rest on what he had
said, without the benefit of counsel, while being interrogated by
police, alone in a room for hours.
22. Id. at *4–*5.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. at *5.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *5 (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at *10 (emphasis added). The brief went on to quote Justice Douglas’s
observation that “what takes place in the secret confines of the police station may be more
critical than what takes place at the trial.” Id. (quoting Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433,
444–45 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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A. Definitions from Classical to Contemporary
The nuanced sense of timeliness afforded by the concept of
kairos helps make an argument “more sensible, more rightful,
and ultimately more persuasive.”28 In leveraging a particular
point in time that is better for a particular purpose than any other
point, kairos blends three related concepts:


At what point is this the right time (as opposed to
any time)?



At what point is this the right setting—a context of
tension, crisis, or conflict that calls for something
other than a generalized solution that might work at
any time?



At what point is this a fitting opportunity—a
situation making a particular rhetorical response
appropriate or presenting the chance to carry out a
purpose that could not be accomplished at some
other time?29

Kairos indicates that there is “an individual time having a
critical ordinal position”—an actual turning point that is marked
off from the time before and after.30 Contemporary rhetoric
scholar John Poulakos suggests that kairos might even be
thought of as the concept that “ideas have their place in time and
unless . . . they are voiced at the precise moment they are called
upon, they miss their chance.”31
In comparison with chronos, the familiar notion that things
unfold as they do because events follow one another not only in

28. John Poulakos, Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric in CONTEMPORARY
RHETORICAL THEORY: A READER 29 (John Louis Lucaites et al., eds. 1989).
29. Smith, supra note 6, at 10–11.
30. Id. at 10 (referring to kaori as “turning points in the historical order, the
opportunities presented, the opportunities seized upon and the opportunities missed, the
qualitative changes and transitions in the lives of individuals and nations and those
constellations of events which made possible some outcome that could not have happened
at any other time”).
31. Poulakos, supra note 28, at 28.
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time but in causal connection,32 kairos is more ambiguous and
complex. First, kairos is defined as meaning both the most
opportune time—a particularly appropriate or fitting opportunity
presenting itself to the writer or speaker—and the essential
moment—the point in time that captures the essence of the
problem or marks a crucial turning point.33
Next, while chronos appears closer to narrative, kairos is
more metaphorical in both process and result. For example, in
comparison with the storyline detailing the sequence of events
over time, kairos is depicted as the discovery, creation, or
capture of a crucial moment of time. Still, even though much of
what we call storytelling is concerned with chronos—that is,
with events arranged in a sequential chain to help us make sense
of what happened (leading us to conclude, perhaps, that things
happen for a reason)—kairos often plays the ah-ha-moment role
in narrative. In the well-told story, we wait for the so-called ticktock, the kairos moment when things fit into place.34 The
narrative arc of stories may depend on the magical moments
when the curtain opens to unveil something previously
unknown. Rather than a final act linking events together in a
way that makes them understandable, this magical moment is an
illustration of kairos within the chronos of a particular narrative.
Chronos and kairos suggest differing authorial techniques,
but even these are overlapping. Unlike the storyteller’s more
passive passage through chronological time, kairos presumes
that the author will intervene in history’s causal chain. In one of
its senses, the kairos moment may appear to the writer or
speaker as a door to be opened to a new possibility, a thread to
be pulled to unravel the existing fabric. In another of its senses,
the kairos moment provides the writer or speaker with the

32. As Jerome Bruner put it, “[w]e seem to have no other way of describing ‘lived
time’ save in the form of a narrative.” Jerome Bruner, Life as Narrative, 54 SOC.
RESEARCH 11, 12 (1987).
33. See Smith, supra note 6, at 10 (referring to turning points), 12 (characterizing a
particular opportune moment as “‘right’ because it serves . . . [a] special purpose”). Smith
writes that chronos is, in contrast to kairos, distinguished by three concepts: (1) the element
of change or motion through a stretch of time, (2) the use of an appropriate unit of
measurement, and (3) the element of serial order captured by the concepts of before and
after. Id. at 6.
34. FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
FICTION 64 (1970).
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setting within which to portray what happens next as natural and
inevitable. This natural inevitability is supplied by the things we
already know, what the Greeks termed doxa—the implicit
knowledge that operates automatically and unconsciously, so
that it “goes without saying because it comes without saying.”35
Crucially, because what goes without saying depends on
when, where, and who you are, the concept of kairos extends
beyond time to include setting and to encompass author and
audience. Aristotle’s descriptions of kairos include both the
“right or opportune time to do something” and “the right
measure in doing something.”36 The inclusion of a sense of
appropriateness as part of the meaning of kairos is shown in the
description of kairos as involving qualitative time (in contrast to
chronos, which addresses quantitative time) and the companion
description of kairic time as “a season” when a particular action
is fitting.37 Thus, kairos incorporates a fully rhetorical sense of
proportion—what is fitting or appropriate to this particular time
and space.
Finally, although kairos requires action by the speaker or
writer, a kairic moment does not come about because the actor
wills it into being. The active quality of kairos is captured in its
definition as “a passing instant in which an opening appears
which must be driven through with force if success is to be
achieved.”38 That this is not only a subjective decision is
suggested by the conclusion that even though kairos is initiated
by action, it in fact enables a “dynamic interplay between
objective and subjective, between opportunity as discerned and
opportunity as defined . . . by including both objective and
subjective dimensions of a moment in time.”39
To illustrate, compare kairos with the “rhetorical
situation.”40 A rhetorical situation exists when an exigence (or
35. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 167 (1977).
36. Kinneavy & Eskin, supra note 6, at 433 (citing Kinneavy, supra note 6, at 80).
37. Smith, supra note 6, at 6 (indicating that kairos is necessary for understanding
times “at which a qualitative character begins to emerge, and when there are junctures of
opportunity calling for human ingenuity in apprehending when the time is ‘right’”).
38. ERIC CHARLES WHITE, KAIRONOMIA: ON THE WILL-TO-INVENT 13 (1987).
39. Carolyn R. Miller, Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science in A RHETORIC OF DOING:
ESSAYS ON WRITTEN DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KINNEAVY 312 (Stephen P.
Witte et al., eds., 1992).
40. Lloyd E. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHET. 1 (1968).
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imperfection) calls out for responsive rhetoric that is aimed at an
audience with the potential to solve or address the
imperfection.41 This view posits the rhetorical situation as
existing objectively outside the speaker and as being discovered
by the speaker (rather than as being constructed by the speaker).
The concept of kairos appears more welcoming: The right time
may be found or it may be created. Thus, while adherents of the
rhetorical-situation view would say that kairos occurs when a
crisis (or an exigence) has punctured the chronos, a critic of that
definition would say that every moment has its kairos that can
be seized and developed in strategic ways.42 Somewhere in
between—and closer to the views of Miller, Smith, and
Poulakos—is the view that the “tool” of kairos (the most
opportune moment) and its “setting” (the essence of the
problem) must act together.43
B. Examples from Fairy Tales to Science
In one of its senses, the concept of kairos resembles
metonymy: Its crystallization of the essential moment leaves us
with a lasting image that stands in for and evokes a larger
context, picture, or story. Fairy tales, for instance, may be
captured in our memory as “a single event rather than a
connected narrative.”44 When we think of Rapunzel, “[t]he
image of the yards of hair tumbling down from the window in
the tower is unforgettable.”45 Although we remember that
41. Id. at 2 (indicating that the situation calls the discourse into existence and reporting
that “Clement Attlee once said that Winston Churchill went around looking for ‘finest
hours,’” and noting that “[t]he point to observe is that Churchill found them—the crisis
situations—and spoke in response to them”).
42. Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHET. 154, 159
(1973) (asserting that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a political crisis largely created by
rhetoric: “A President dramatically announced on nationwide television and radio that there
was a grave crisis threatening the country. This was accompanied by symbolic crisis
activity including troop and missile deployment, executive formation of ad hoc crisis
committees, unavailability of high government officials, summoning of Congressional
leaders, etc.”).
43. See Scott Consigny, Rhetoric and Its Situations, 7 PHIL. & RHET. 175, 181 (1974)
(suggesting that the “real question” is how the user of rhetoric “can become engaged in the
novel and indeterminate situation and yet have a means of making sense of it”).
44. PHILIP PULLMAN, FAIRY TALES FROM THE BROTHERS GRIMM: A NEW ENGLISH
VERSION 63 (2012).
45. Id.
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image, we forget what happened before and after. “What about
her poor parents, for example? They long for years to have a
child, and then she’s born, and the witch takes her away and
then we hear no more about them.”46 Rapunzel’s hair is the
lasting image that crystallizes and forever after evokes the
essence of the story.
Another example of kairos as a lasting image can be found
in the metaphor used to describe changing scientific accounts of
the development of the universe. “Only a century ago the
universe was held to be eternal and unchanging. Then came the
expanding universe and the Big Bang, an origin almost biblical
in nature, like a girl bursting out of a cake.”47 This singular
moment—the metaphorical Big Bang—now marks our changed
understanding of the nature of things. The image is isolated and
essential, focusing our thoughts on one bead, rather than on a
series of events strung together like links in a chain.48
As for kairos in its sense as “the most opportune moment,”
an illustration can be found in the career path of the nowconventional metaphor that the mind is a computer.49 When this
metaphor was first used, it was novel, that is, the source domain
(the computer) had not previously been applied to the target
domain (the mind).50 To understand the metaphor, the reader
had to try to align the characteristics and relationships existing
within a computer with those existing within a mind: For
example, both appear to take in data and to process it before
producing some kind of report.51 Appearing at a most opportune
time, when scientists had only recently begun to use computers
in their everyday activities, the mind-as-computer metaphor
generated not only a new way of seeing but also a new way of
studying the mind.52

46. Id.
47. Dennis Overbye, A Quantum of Solace, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2013, at D1 (crediting
the cake metaphor to cosmologist Fred Hoyle).
48. See id. (noting that “a single moment of insight or beauty or grace . . . can
illuminate eternity”).
49. Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Mind As Computer: Birth of a Metaphor,
9 CREATIVITY RES. J. 131, 131, 134–35 (1996).
50. See id. at 135–43.
51. See id. at 136.
52. Id. at 142–43.
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To sum up, kairos may be understood as a concept
incorporating time (the most opportune time); space (the
essential point in time that embodies the story or the concept);
action (the author’s use of the time and space); and fittingness
(each of these matching up with the other). These characteristics
can be seen in the spatial metaphors for kairos: In both weaving
and archery, the Greeks conceived of kairos as an opening or an
aperture “through which an arrow or a shuttle must be passed for
success.”53 When used in this sense, kairos has both objective
and subjective dimensions: The opening must be one into which
the writer can fit his claim as well as one that the reader
recognizes as real.54
III. JUDICIAL USE OF CHRONOS AND KAIROS
A. Introduction: The Phagan Murder and the Frank Lynching
In the late summer and early fall of 1913, Leo Frank, the
Jewish manager of a pencil factory in Atlanta, Georgia, was
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Mary
Phagan, a thirteen-year-old girl who worked in the factory.55
When Frank’s case came before the Supreme Court at the end of
a long line of motions and appeals, he was denied habeas
relief.56 Based on claims that the trial had been disrupted by
mass public outcry and tainted by strains of anti-Semitism,
Georgia’s governor then commuted Frank’s death sentence.57
Within weeks, a group of Georgia residents planned and carried
out Frank’s abduction from the state prison farm and his
subsequent lynching.58 Decades later, Frank was posthumously
53. Miller, supra note 39, at 313.
54. Id. (discussing scholarship as the opening of a space in existing research that will
both accommodate new work and invite the reader’s acceptance of that work).
55. STEVE ONEY, AND THE DEAD SHALL RISE: THE MURDER OF MARY PHAGAN AND
THE LYNCHING OF LEO FRANK 190, 340–45, 377 (2004) (indicating that Frank’s trial
started on July 28, that the jury returned its verdict on August 25, and that the court
sentenced Frank on August 26).
56. Frank, 237 U.S. at 345.
57. ONEY, supra note 55, at 488–503 (recounting the governor’s investigation and
deliberation).
58. Id. at 513–28, 561–72 (naming participants in abduction plan and describing
lynching).
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pardoned, not on the grounds of innocence but on the basis that
Georgia had failed to protect his rights.59
The Phagan murder and the Frank lynching are viewed as
turning points in American history.60 The group of Georgia
citizens who formed the Knights of Mary Phagan would help
revive the Ku Klux Klan.61 Formed during the trial, the AntiDefamation League gained momentum after Frank’s lynching,62
which is believed to have been the only lynching of a Jewish
victim in the United States.63 Some Jewish citizens left Atlanta
after Frank’s lynching; others worked harder to appear no
different from their non-Jewish neighbors.64
In the hundred years since the Frank trial, many historical
and fictional versions have depicted the events and the
atmosphere surrounding the investigation, the trial, and its
aftermath.65 These histories demonstrate that common
understandings of the events and their significance diverged

59. Id. at 647–49; see also Georgia Pardons Victim 70 Years after Lynching, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1986, at A16.
60. See ONEY, supra note 55, at 649. Readers interested in historians’ treatment of the
case might consult Leonard Dinnerstein’s THE LEO FRANK CASE, published in 1968 by
Columbia University Press, for an influential account. Many other sources are cited in
ONEY, supra note 55, at 709–12.
61. ONEY, supra note 55, at 605 (noting that several men associated with the abduction
were “reputedly among” those who orchestrated the Georgia Klan’s reappearance in 1915).
62. Id. at 617.
63. Peter Jacobs, The Lynching of a Jewish Man in Georgia 100 Years Ago Changed
America Forever, BUSINESS INSIDER (AUG. 18, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/leo
-frank-lynching-in-georgia-100-years-ago-changed-america-forever-2015-8 (characterizing
Frank’s death as “[t]he only high-profile lynching of an American Jew”). Most victims of
lynching were African-American. One recent accounting numbers nearly 3,500 AfricanAmerican victims of lynching in the Southern states between 1877 and 1950. Lynching,
Whites & Negroes, 1882–1968, TUSKEGEE UNIV. ARCHIVES REPOSITORY (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://192.203.127.197/archive/handle/123456789/511 (indicating in addition that from
1882 to 1968, 39 whites and 492 African-Americans were lynched in Georgia alone).
Another account documents 3,959 terror lynchings of African-Americans in Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia between 1877 and 1950. LYNCHING IN AMERICA:
CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR, REPORT SUMMARY 4–5 (2015). Georgia
was one of the states with the highest absolute numbers of lynchings. Id. at 5.
64. ONEY, supra note 55, at 616–19.
65. MAROUF HASIAN JR., LEGAL MEMORIES AND AMNESIAS IN AMERICA’S
RHETORICAL CULTURE 135, 148 n. 1 (2000) (referring to “countless newspaper stories,
hundreds of magazine articles, dozens of books, and at least four films” about the case, and
collecting historical sources and scholarly studies).
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along race, class, and gender lines; between the North and the
South; and between progressives and populists.66
The section of this essay that follows this introduction
concentrates on the interaction between historical and cultural
turning points and the manner in which the Supreme Court
addressed the habeas petition alleging that mob domination had
overpowered the processes of justice in Frank’s trial. First, I
compare the Supreme Court’s denial of Frank’s habeas petition
with the dissent from Justice Holmes.67 After that, I contrast the
Holmes dissent in Frank with Justice Holmes’s opinion for the
Court in a similar case decided ten years later.68
This extended discussion is intended to suggest some ways
to think, both theoretically and practically, about the concepts of
kairos and chronos. After-the-fact rhetorical readings are able to
look through a wider lens than is available to an appellate judge
constrained by a record, a role, a line of precedent, and a
standard of review. In Frank, the Court was seemingly stuck in
time—the time captured within the record of the appeal.
According to that record, a series of events had unfolded in
chronological order, easily demonstrating that due process
standards had been satisfied.69 In contrast to this chronological
recounting, Justice Holmes’s dissent isolated and focused on a
kairos moment punctuating the passage of chronological time.70
Like a documentary filmmaker, Justice Holmes turned the
camera lens this way and that, and he was able to see and show
not only the chronicle of events but also the crucial conflicts and
tensions as they were embedded in the chronicle’s symbolic and
exemplary moments.
B. The Story of Leo Frank and Mary Phagan
A few days after Mary Phagan’s body was found in the
basement of the National Pencil Company factory, Leo Frank

66. Id. at 143–46.
67. See infra parts III(C) and III(D).
68. See infra part IV.
69. Frank, 237 U.S. at 344–45.
70. Id. at 345–46 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting “strong” anti-Frank hostility in
courtroom crowd, applause upon announcement of guilty verdict, and the like).
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was charged with her April 26, 1913, murder.71 Frank, the
twenty-nine-year-old superintendent of the factory, had moved
to Atlanta nearly five years earlier; he had earned an engineering
degree from Cornell and had gained experience at companies in
Massachusetts and New York.72 In Atlanta, he married Lucille
Selig, the granddaughter of a co-founder of one of Atlanta’s
synagogues, and in 1913, he was elected president of a lodge of
the B’Nai Brith.73
Phagan, the thirteen-year-old daughter of a white farmer,
had moved with her mother and stepfather from Marietta
(twenty miles away) to Atlanta. There she started working parttime in a factory at the age of ten. Following her first full-time
job at eleven, she went to work at the National Pencil Company
factory when she was twelve.74 On the day before her body was
discovered in the basement, she had visited the factory to pick
up her paycheck from Frank.75 He was the last person known to
have seen her alive.76
Initially, there were several other suspects, including Newt
Lee, the night watchman who found her body, and Jim Conley, a
janitor at the factory.77 But the prosecutors decided that the bulk
of the evidence pointed to Frank, and he was tried for and
convicted of the murder.78 During the trial, the prosecutor
portrayed Frank as a sexual pervert.79 Conley, the janitor who
had been arrested in connection with the murder, admitted
writing two notes found near Phagan’s body. During the trial,
Conley claimed that Frank had confessed to the murder and that
Frank had paid him to write down what Frank dictated and to
help him move Phagan’s body.80
On August 26, 1913, after four weeks of testimony, the jury
found Frank guilty in less than four hours, and the judge
71. ONEY, supra note 55, at 61–70.
72. Id. at 9–13.
73. Id
74. Id. at 3–5.
75. Id. at 9, 29.
76. Id. at 62.
77. Id. at 22–33 (Lee), 118–44 (Conley).
78. Id. at 190–306, 340–44.
79. Id. at 363, 376 (referring to accusations of perversion and to “vile, vicious and
damning stories”).
80. Id. at 238–57.
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sentenced Frank to death.81 Before the verdict, fearing a possibly
violent public reaction, the judge had advised Frank and his
lawyer not to be present in the courtroom when the verdict was
announced.82
After a series of unsuccessful appeals and amidst
continuing public controversy and national news coverage, the
Supreme Court denied Frank’s habeas petition.83 Frank’s
sentence was subsequently commuted by Georgia Governor
John Slaton.84 The same day, a mob made its way to the
governor’s mansion, resulting in the declaration of martial law.85
In Marietta, where Phagan’s family had once lived, the governor
was hanged in effigy, with a sign reading “John M. Slaton, King
of the Jews and Traitor Governor of Georgia.”86
Several days later, a group of men gathered in Marietta and
started planning.87 After an earlier effort was thwarted, the
group of Marietta men who eventually traveled 150 miles to the
Georgia State Prison Farm in Milledgeville encountered little
resistance at its hospital, where they found and abducted
Frank.88 Taken by car back to the grounds of a cotton gin in
Marietta, Frank was hanged.89
According to several rhetorical analyses of the Frank trial,
characterizations of race, gender, and class were crucial to its
conduct and results. Phagan was described as a “perfectly
innocent child,” and “the victim of a ‘pervert’” while Frank was
a “Northern Jew.”90 Frank was also characterized as “highly
‘nervous,’” and the prosecutor introduced evidence intended to
show “a history of womanizing and ‘unnatural’ behavior.”91

81. Id. at 340–44.
82. Id. at 340.
83. Frank, 237 U.S. at 345.
84. ONEY, supra note 55, at 469–512.
85. Id. at 503–04.
86. Id. at 504–05.
87. Id. at 513–28. The group included a former governor and a judge, although they
would not personally participate in all the events that followed. Id.
88. Id. at 558–62. Frank was being treated in the prison hospital because he had been
seriously injured in an attack by a fellow prisoner. Id. at 559.
89. Id. at 562–65.
90. HASIAN, supra note 65, at 132.
91. Id. at 136.
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Conley played the role of the “‘good Negro,’ docile, singleminded, and truthful.”92 According to one analyst, before the
Frank trial, the public understanding of race in the South was
predominantly binary: Blacks were poor, uneducated, and
existed outside society.93 In contrast, “[w]hites were . . . those by
whom and for whom the law courts had been created; in the
courts, whites dispensed justice and received justice.”94 In
Frank’s case, however, two black men had been considered as
suspects and then passed over for prosecution.95 “Moreover, one
of the principal witnesses [against Frank] was black, and this
case is often cited as the first time a black man was allowed to
testify in a Southern court against a white man.”96 What changed
most, according at least one analysis, was the characterization of
whiteness. “[W]hiteness was now openly contested and in some
cases contingent.”97
Similarly, the trial affected the community’s views of
gender and of what it meant to be “Southern.” Rather than the
genteel Southern lady of means and refinement, a young girl
who worked in a factory became the “iconic representation of a
rural South that found itself violated by a financially healthy
North.”98
C. Chronos and Justice Pitney
Justice Pitney wrote for the Court in Frank.99 Both his
reasoning and his holding were confined by the timeline of
chronos, the linear passage of events over time as accounted for
within the appellate record. Justice Pitney describes this view of
the process to which Frank was subject:
Frank, having been formally accused of a grave crime, was
placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction,
92. Lolita Buckner Inniss, A Critical Legal Rhetoric Approach to In Re AfricanAmerican Slave Descendants Litigation, 24 J. OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECON. DEV. 649, 683
(2010).
93. Id. at 684.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 685.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 683 (quoting Hasian, supra note 65).
99. 237 U.S. at 309–45.
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with a jury lawfully constituted; he had a public trial,
deliberately conducted, with the benefit of counsel for his
defense; he was found guilty and sentenced pursuant to the
laws of the state; twice he has moved the trial court to grant
a new trial, and once to set aside the verdict as a nullity;
three times he has been heard upon appeal before the court
of last resort of that state, and in every instance the adverse
action of the trial court has been affirmed; his allegations of
hostile public sentiment and disorder in and about the court
room, improperly influencing the trial court and the jury
against him, have been rejected because found untrue in
point of fact upon evidence presumably justifying that
finding, and which he has not produced in the present
proceeding; his contention that his lawful rights were
infringed because he was not permitted to be present when
the jury rendered its verdict has been set aside because it
was waived by his failure to raise the objection in due
100
season when fully cognizant of the facts.

After recounting these events, one following the other
without any conflict to interrupt the flow, Justice Pitney
concluded that “[Frank] has been convicted, and is now held in
custody, under ‘due process of law’ within the meaning of the
Constitution.”101 As Justice Pitney recounted the chronological
lockstep of the judicial process, no outside facts from the
defendant’s actual experience were allowed to intrude. The
majority saw only that the appropriate forms of due process had
been observed, one after the other:


the court had jurisdiction,



the jury was lawfully constituted,



the trial was public, and



the defendant had the benefit of counsel.

In his prefatory statement reviewing the findings of the
Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Pitney minimized the effects of
the public’s behavior on the courtroom atmosphere by labeling
100. Id. at 344–45.
101. Id. at 345.
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the claims as involving two “innocuous matter[s].”102 He
attributed the first claim, spectators laughing during the
defendant’s evidence, to “a witty answer by the [defense’s]
witness.”103 As for the second, “spectators applaud[ing] the
result of a colloquy between the solicitor general and counsel for
the accused,”104 he wrote that the judge quickly remedied the
problem by expressing disapproval and calling on the sheriff to
maintain order.105
Based on affidavits from jurors who said they were not
affected, Justice Pitney rejected Frank’s claims that loud
cheering in the streets had affected the jury as its members were
polled.106 He further discounted the effects of the public reaction
on the jury by evaluating as a separate matter the trial judge’s
advice to the defendant and his lawyer to stay out of the
courtroom when the verdict was announced for fear of violent
reprisal.107 By isolating this point from his discussion of order
within the courtroom, Justice Pitney was able to sidestep the
combined inference that the judge and the jury felt pressured by
the crowd inside the room and gathered outside in the streets.108
Although Justice Pitney addressed Frank’s account of what
happened during the trial, both inside and outside the courtroom,
he discussed it only to discredit it:
[T]he petition contains a narrative of disorder, hostile
manifestations, and uproar, which, if it stood alone, and
were taken as true, may be conceded to show an
environment inconsistent with a fair trial and an impartial
verdict. But to consider this as standing alone is to take a
109
wholly superficial view.

While acknowledging the “narrative,” Justice Pitney
characterized it as incomplete or irrelevant. It had already been
examined and dismissed by both the trial court and the Georgia

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 313.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315–16.
Id.
Id. at 332.
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Supreme Court, and so Justice Pitney implied that it was
unnecessary for his Court to review it.110
Justice Pitney framed the issues narrowly, as questions of
procedure, starting with whether the case was even properly
before the Court.111 Once he concluded that the case was
properly brought, he emphasized the continuing procedural
nature of the case:
[T]he essential question before us . . . is not the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner, or the truth of any particular fact
asserted by him, but whether the state, taking into view the
entire course of its procedure, has deprived him of due
112
process of law.

Finally, he found that Frank had made a procedural error: He
waited too long to raise an objection to his having been absent as
the jury delivered the verdict.113 By the time Justice Pitney
reached the question presented, it was a foregone conclusion that
Frank had received all the process that was due.
D. Kairos and Justice Holmes
Before filing the habeas petition raising the due process
challenge, Frank had applied to two Supreme Court Justices for
review of the denial of a new trial based on his absence from the
court when the jury returned its verdict. As had Justice Lamar,
Justice Holmes declined to issue the writ,114 saying that he was
bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, but
declaring that
[o]n these facts, I very seriously doubt if the petitioner
(Frank) has had due process of law—not on the ground of
his absence when the verdict was rendered so much as
because of the trial taking place in the presence of a hostile
demonstration and seemingly dangerous crowd, thought by

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 333.
Id. at 333–35.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 339–40 (noting that Frank’s first new-trial motion did not raise this ground).
ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF
LIBERTY 56 (2003).
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the presiding Judge to be ready for violence unless a verdict
115
of guilty was rendered.

Later, in his dissent from denial of the habeas petition,
Justice Holmes gave a much different account of the due process
record than had Justice Pitney, focusing on moments during the
trial rather than on the tidy chronology of the appellate process:
The trial began on July 28, 1913, at Atlanta, and was
carried on in a court packed with spectators and surrounded
by a crowd outside, all strongly hostile to the petitioner. On
Saturday, August 23, this hostility was sufficient to lead the
judge to confer in the presence of the jury with the chief of
police of Atlanta and the colonel of the Fifth Georgia
Regiment, stationed in that city, both of whom were known
116
to the jury.

Justice Holmes pointed out that members of the press had
asked the court not to continue proceedings that evening because
of the potential danger, and that the court had adjourned until the
following Monday.117 Further, “[o]n that morning, when the
solicitor general entered the court, he was greeted with applause,
stamping of feet and clapping of hands,” and the judge advised
Frank’s counsel that it would be safer if not only Frank but also
his lawyer were not present in the courtroom when the verdict
was returned.118 Finally, Justice Holmes focused again on the
public’s response: “When the verdict was rendered, and before
more than one of the jurymen had been polled, there was such a
roar of applause that the polling could not go on until order was
restored.”119
From Justice Holmes’s opinion, the reader learns that what
Justice Pitney characterized as a routine “public trial” that
proceeded according to form120 was in fact a trial carried out in a
courtroom packed with hostile spectators who clapped their
hands and stamped their feet with approval when the solicitor
general entered and then applauded again when the verdict was

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

ONEY, supra note 55, at 449.
Frank, 237 U.S. at 345 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 345–46 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting)
See text accompanying notes 100 & 101, supra.
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rendered.121 From Justice Holmes’s opinion, the reader learns
that even though Frank was represented by counsel, his counsel
was advised that it would be safer for him and Frank to be
absent from the courtroom when the verdict was returned.122
Through these kinds of concrete details focusing on key
moments from the conduct of the trial, Justice Holmes provided
a basis for his conclusion that even if the process observed the
appropriate form, the form itself was “empty.”123
Even as he renders an apparently straightforward and
chronological version of the facts, Justice Holmes carves out
space, an opening for the distilled image of these points in time:
As a result of these circumstances, “the trial was dominated by a
hostile mob and was nothing but an empty form.”124
IV. JUSTICE HOLMES AND KAIROS REALIZED
Not only does the past inform the present case, but the
125
decision in the present case changes the past.

Less than a decade after the decision in Frank, an almost
indistinguishable trial and appellate process took place in
Arkansas, where five African-Americans were convicted of
murder and sentenced to death following a series of race riots.126
Again the Supreme Court received a habeas petition raising the
same due process issue decided in Frank, which had not been
overruled or reconsidered in the intervening years. Yet the
outcome in Moore v. Dempsey, with Justice Holmes writing for
the Court, was an order directing the trial court to undertake an
independent examination of the facts in the petition to determine
if a due process violation had taken place.127
121. Id. at 345–46 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
125. LINDA ROSS MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY 30 (2010).
126. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89 (1923) (noting that, during the trial, “[t]he
Court and neighborhood were thronged with an adverse crowd that threatened the most
dangerous consequences to anyone interfering with the desired result”).
127. Id. at 92 (concluding that “the District Judge should find whether the facts alleged
are true and whether they can be explained so far as to leave the state proceedings
undisturbed” and directing that the case was “to stand for hearing before the District

BERGERPERSONAL (DO NOT DELETE)

168

6/7/2016 1:31 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

Although the composition of the Court had shifted, kairos
suggests that changed membership alone fails to explain the
change in outcome.128 Instead, Justice Holmes used the kairic
opening he had begun to construct in Frank to send the denial of
habeas back to the trial court for fact-finding.129 When he wrote
for the Moore majority, Justice Holmes gave no hint that he was
in effect reversing the holding in Frank. In its structure and
effect, Justice Holmes’s decision in Moore is a quintessential
example of the judicial use of kairos to bring about changes in
the law.130
In Moore, the five defendants had been convicted of
murder in the first degree and sentenced to death.131 Their
attorney called no witnesses, their trial lasted forty-five minutes,
and the jury deliberated for five minutes.132 After a lengthy
appellate process, the defendants eventually filed a habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, claiming that they had been denied due
process because their trial was a trial only in form, not in
substance, and that they were convicted under the pressure of a
mob.133

Court”). The hearing ordered in Moore was never held. J. S. Waterman & E. E. Overton,
The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 117, 122 (1933). Instead, the
defendants’ counsel agreed to dismiss the petition if the prisoners’ death sentences were
commuted to twelve years. Id. Six years later, the prisoners received indefinite furloughs.
Id. at 122–23.
128. See Eric M. Freedman, Leo Frank Lives: Untangling The Historical Roots of
Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467,
1499–1501 (2000) (indicating that almost half the Justices hearing Moore had not been on
the Court when Frank was decided, but also pointing out that both lynchings and public
concern about lynching were increasing when Moore was decided, and that the NAACP
was then involved in a highly visible campaign in support of a federal anti-lynching law).
129. Moore, 261 U.S. at 92.
130. See Freedman, supra note 128, at 1472 (recognizing that both Frank and Moore
“require in-depth federal habeas corpus review of state prisoner convictions” and
concluding that their differing outcomes “reflect no more than differing discretionary
determinations in specific factual settings”); see also Colin Starger, Expanding Stare
Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY.
L.A. L. Rev. 77 (2012) (mapping due-process doctrine as a continuing argument involving
differing schools of legal thought).
131. 261 U.S. at 89–90.
132. Id. at 89.
133. Id. at 87.
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According to the petition, as re-stated by Justice Holmes,


On the night of September 30, 1919, a number of
colored people assembled in their church were
attacked and fired upon by a body of white men,
and in the disturbance that followed a white man
134
was killed.



[This event] was followed by the hunting down and
shooting of many Negroes and also by the killing
on October 1 of one Clinton Lee, a white man, for
135
whose murder the petitioners were indicted.

Following these killings, Justice Holmes notes, the
government and the community responded in ways that were
woven into the social fabric of the time and place:


A Committee of Seven was appointed by the
Governor in regard to what the committee called
136
the “insurrection” in the county.



Shortly after the arrest of the petitioners a mob
marched to the jail for the purpose of lynching
them but were prevented by the presence of United
States troops and the promise of some of the
Committee of Seven and other leading officials that
if the mob would refrain . . . they would execute
137
those found guilty in the form of law.

Justice Holmes then describes the defendants meeting their
lawyer on the day their trial began, which was also the day on
which it ended, for it took less than an hour:

134. Id. For purposes of this analysis, I have presented individual sentences from the
opinion as individual bullet points. In the original, some are combined and some are not.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 88.
137. Id. at 88–89.
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On November 3 the petitioners were brought into
Court, informed that a certain lawyer was
appointed their counsel and were placed on trial
before a white jury—blacks being systematically
138
excluded from both grand and petit juries.



The Court and neighborhood were thronged with
an adverse crowd that threatened the most
dangerous consequences to anyone interfering with
139
the desired result.



The counsel did not venture to demand delay or a
change of venue, to challenge a juryman or to ask
140
for separate trials.



He had had no preliminary consultation with the
accused, called no witnesses for the defence
although they could have been produced, and did
141
not put the defendants on the stand.



The trial lasted about three-quarters of an hour and
in less than five minutes the jury brought in a
142
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.

After thus re-accounting for the facts as expressed by the
Moore petitioners, Justice Holmes turned to the law,
characterizing the majority opinion in Frank in a wholly new
light. There, he said,
it was recognized of course that if in fact a trial is
dominated by a mob so that there is an actual interference
with the course of justice, there is a departure from due
process of law; and that “if the State, supplying no
corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of
death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his
143
life or liberty without due process of law.”

Even though “mere mistakes of law” are not to be corrected
by habeas corpus, Justice Holmes emphasized that these kinds of
mistakes were not what was at stake in Moore.144 Instead,
if the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask—that
counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts
failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the
machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial
court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an
immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from
145
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.

To further explain and support his reversal and order that the
district court hear the facts of the case, Justice Holmes provided
no further authorities or justification. And he referred not at all
to the question of whether the Court’s opinion in Moore marked
a change in the principles established in Frank. Instead, he wrote
only that the Court would
not say more concerning the corrective process afforded to
the petitioners than that it does not seem to us sufficient to
allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of
examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they
146
make the trial absolutely void.

Dissenting, Justice McReynolds uncovered the opening that
Justice Holmes had quietly constructed and complained that the
majority opinion in Frank had been set aside:
In [Frank], after great consideration a majority of this court
approved the doctrine which should be applied here. The
doctrine is right and wholesome. I can not agree now to put
it aside and substitute the views expressed by the minority
147
of the court in that cause.

He went on to consider the record, virtually echoing the majority
in Frank by finding that there was nothing unusual in a record
silent about irregularities. Instead, the record as he recounted it
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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seemingly captured the deliberate due process of the judicial
system:148


There was the complete record of the cause in the
state courts—trial and Supreme—showing no
149
irregularity.



After indictment the defendants were arraigned for
trial and eminent counsel appointed to defend
them.
 He cross-examined the witnesses, made
exceptions, and evidently was careful to
preserve a full and complete transcript of
150
the proceedings.



The trial was unusually short but there is nothing in
the record to indicate that it was illegally
151
hastened.



November 3, 1919, the jury returned a verdict of
“guilty”; November 11th the defendants were
sentenced to be executed on December 27th;
December 20th new counsel chosen by them or
their friends moved for a new trial and supported
152
the motion by affidavits.
 This motion questioned the validity of the
conviction upon the very grounds now
153
advanced.

Given this accounting, Justice McReynolds concluded that he
was “unable to say that the District Judge, acquainted with local

148. As before, I have presented individual sentences from this opinion as separate
bullet points.
149. Id. at 96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 96–97 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 97 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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conditions, erred when he held the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus insufficient.”154
In Moore as in Frank, Justice Holmes appeared to provide
a conventionally chronological accounting for the facts of the
trial. But within that chronological account, he carved away the
outward form of the trial to show the essential space within, the
points in time from which it appeared clear that a mob had
dominated the judicial process. Taking advantage of the opening
that first emerged in his Frank dissent, Justice Holmes was able
to move through it to order a new hearing in Moore: If in fact
the trial has been dominated by a mob, there has been no due
process. Given that, the trial court must be given the opportunity
to make the crucial factual finding on remand.
The kairos explanation of Justice Holmes’s work turns on
timely intersections. The time for recognizing the empty form of
a trial was not yet opportune when Justice Holmes wrote his
Frank dissent. But that dissent pulled a thread in the tightly
woven judicial fabric constructed by law, history, culture, and
social forces. By the time of Moore, the weave had loosened, the
fabric had become more open, and Justice Holmes was able to
tear an opening that was large enough to accommodate his
ruling.
V. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, KAIROS,
AND THE LIFE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Much as Justice Holmes used his dissent in Frank to set up
an opportune moment nearly ten years later in Moore, Chief
Justice Roberts constructed a kairic moment by crafting a
compromise majority opinion on the Voting Rights Act
(VRA).155 Through this means, Chief Justice Roberts was able
154. Id. at 101 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
155. Many thanks to Ruth Anne Robbins for reminding me that I expressed this concept
at a presentation about kairos. Others have suggested similar concepts in different terms,
including at least one reference to the embedding of “time bombs” in opinions to be
detonated in later cases. Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time
Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779
(2012). Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Ginsburg are said to have sent “messages about the
kinds of cases they would like to hear” in recent opinions. Adam Liptak, With Subtle
Signals, Justices Request the Cases They Want to Hear, N.Y. TIMES A14 (July 7, 2015)
(referring to Justice Kennedy’s apparent interest in the Court’s receiving a case about
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later to take advantage of an opportune moment that changed the
course of the VRA.
The opportunity was seeded in Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District No. 1 v. Holder,156 decided with only Justice
Thomas in dissent. The opportunity was harvested in Shelby
County v. Holder,157 in which the Chief Justice “relied heavily
on his opinion in a predecessor case [Northwest Austin] . . . that
expressed strong constitutional doubts about the Voting Rights
Act but stopped just short of pulling the trigger.”158 The Justices
who might have been expected to preserve the VRA were silent
when the majority in Northwest Austin expressed its
constitutional doubts.159 And by that silence, they effectively
signed on to the chief justice’s critique of Section 5—his
now famous claim that “things have changed in the South,”
as well as his assertion that the Voting Rights Act’s past
accomplishment was not by itself “adequate justification to
160
retain the preclearance requirements.”

Because they did not dissent, “the liberal justices even
subscribed to the argument that ‘a departure from the
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently
related to the problem that it targets.’”161 This “fundamental
principle” was a centerpiece of Chief Justice Roberts’s later
opinion in Shelby County, becoming “the constitutional basis for
his critique of requiring some states but not others to obtain the
federal government’s approval before making changes in voting
procedures.”162

solitary confinement and to Justices Breyer and Ginsburg’s apparent interest in its
receiving a case about the death penalty).
156. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
157. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
158. Linda Greenhouse, The Cost of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 10,
2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-cost-of-compromise/.
159. Id. (characterizing the Court’s “liberal bloc at the time” as consisting of Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, and suggesting that they had joined the earlier opinion in
order to buy the VRA a little more time—hoping, perhaps, that Congress would update it
before another VRA case came before the Court).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Emphasizing the opening created by the compromise in
Northwest Austin, Chief Justice Roberts reminded the Shelby
County dissenters that they had agreed to this: “Eight members
of the court subscribed to these views”163 in Northwest Austin.
He even chastised the dissent for “analyz[ing] the question
presented as if our decision in Northwest Austin never
happened,” and for “refus[ing] to consider the principle of equal
sovereignty, despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its
significance.”164
Chief Justice Roberts’s movement through the opening he
created is kairic in every sense, emphasizing the crucial
interplay of time, place, and opportunity for action. First, he
characterized the VRA as a one-in-a-million legislative response
to a once-in-a-lifetime situation: It “employed extraordinary
measures to address an extraordinary problem.”165 The
requirement that states get federal permission before enacting
laws about voting was “a drastic departure from basic principles
of federalism,”166 as was the requirement’s application to only
some states—“an equally dramatic departure from the principle
that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”167
Then, he turned to the kairic setting he had created:
Granted that voting discrimination still exists, the question of the
moment was whether the “current burdens” were “justified by
current needs.”168 The existence of a question of the moment
creates the need for action in that moment.
Like Justice Holmes, Chief Justice Roberts wrote as though
his decision was unremarkable and strictly in line with both
precedent and the expectations of the judicial role. It was, in his
view, the dissent that was taking remarkable action, ignoring
prior precedent by “refus[ing] to consider the principle of equal
sovereignty, despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its
significance.”169 Moreover, everything about the history of the
question pointed to the finding that a less-stringent enforcement
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2621.
Id. at 2630.
Id. at 2618.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2619 (quoting Northwest Austin).
Id. at 2630.
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of the voting-rights requirements was needed because
circumstances had changed: In Northwest Austin, the Court had
“emphasized the ‘dramatic’ progress since 1965.”170
So as the Chief Justice saw it, the law and the facts were on
his side. Further, the occasion was appropriate because
Northwest Austin had put everyone on notice that something
needed to be done:
[I]n issuing that decision, we expressed our broader
concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress
could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but
did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no
171
choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”

Finally, the action was fitting and proper for the occasion. The
decision was no bigger than the opening that had been created,
and took only a small step because it “in no way affects the
permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting
found in § 2,” and includes “no holding on § 5 itself, only on the
coverage formula.”172
Even though others might have claimed that the right
moment had not yet arrived, Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that “[o]ur country has changed, and while any racial
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that
the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current
conditions.”173
VI. JUSTICE ALITO, KAIROS, AND THE GROWTH
OF CORPORATE RIGHTS
An unusually obvious setup of the most opportune moment
occurred in Citizens United v. FEC.174 After scheduling the case
for re-argument and adding the question of whether two prior

170. Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 201).
171. Id. at 2631.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down corporate campaign-finance spending limits
and overruling both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2013)).
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cases should be overruled,175 the Supreme Court decided that the
answer was yes.176 This decision meant that corporations would
thereafter be treated as if they were individual speakers when it
came to spending (a stand-in for the free expression protected by
the First Amendment) in political campaigns.
Once Citizens United had been decided, the most opportune
moment for an argument to expand corporate rights to
encompass religious expression appeared within grasp. As the
Tenth Circuit wrote, “the First Amendment logic of Citizens
United . . . where the Supreme Court has recognized a First
Amendment right of for-profit corporations to express
themselves for political purposes” applies as well to religion.177
Thus, the Tenth Circuit could discern “no reason the Supreme
Court would recognize constitutional protection for a
corporation’s political expression but not its religious
expression.”178
Indeed, apparently following just this logic, the Court
decided in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.179 that the
protections provided for “a person” by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) should be extended to protect some
corporations.180 Thus, the Court held, requiring a closely held
corporation to provide insurance for contraceptives in violation
of its owners’ religious beliefs was prohibited under RFRA. This
175. Order in Pending Case 2–3, Citizens United v. FEC, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/062909zr.pdf (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-205) (restoring case to
calendar for reargument and directing parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
whether the Court should “overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and . . . part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n,
540 U.S. 93 (2003)”); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(asserting that “[f]ive Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us,
so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law”).
176. 558 U.S. at 365–66.
177. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted). Hobby Lobby was consolidated at the Supreme Court with Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), in which the Third
Circuit had rejected the same package of arguments.
178. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135.
179. ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
180. Id. at 2768, 2769 (pointing out that “protecting the free-exercise rights of
corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the
humans who own and control those companies,” and that “allowing Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty” of the families
who control these closely held corporations).

BERGERPERSONAL (DO NOT DELETE)

178

6/7/2016 1:31 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

holding was based on the Court’s acquiescence in the corporate
argument that a corporation takes on the religious beliefs of its
owners.181
Writing for the Court in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito
captured essential moments in time by telling the story of the
creation of the corporate plaintiffs. Isolating the creation
moments from the chronological timeline of the case as
docketed allowed him to distill the essence of his reasoning that
“protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of
the humans who own and control those companies.”182
To construct an image of a corporate entity with religious
beliefs, Justice Alito captured singular moments involving the
humans who had owned and controlled those companies over
the years. At the beginning of his description of the Hobby
Lobby facts,183 he wrote:


David and Barbara Green and their three children
are Christians who own and operate two family
184
businesses.



Forty-five years ago, David Green started an artsand-crafts store that has grown into a nationwide
185
chain called Hobby Lobby.



There are now 500 Hobby Lobby stores, and the
186
company has more than 13,000 employees.



Hobby Lobby is organized as a for-profit
187
corporation under Oklahoma law.

181. Id. at 2774–75.
182. Id. at 2768.
183. As before, I have presented individual sentences from this opinion as separate
bullet points.
184. Id. at 2765.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citation omitted).
187. Id.
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One of David’s sons started an affiliated business,
Mardel, which operates 35 Christian bookstores
188
and employs close to 400 people.



Mardel is also organized as a for-profit corporation
189
under Oklahoma law.

179

Concentrating on the long-ago creation moments of the
corporation involved in the companion case, Justice Alito wrote:

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.



Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons
are devout members of the Mennonite Church, a
Christian denomination. The Mennonite Church
opposes abortion and believes that “[t]he fetus in
its earliest stages . . . shares humanity with those
190
who conceived it.



Fifty years ago, Norman Hahn started a woodworking business in his garage, and since then, this
company, Conestoga Wood Specialties, has grown
191
and now has 950 employees.



Conestoga is organized under Pennsylvania law as
192
a for-profit corporation.



The Hahns exercise sole ownership of the closely
held business; they control its board of directors
193
and hold all of its voting shares.



One of the Hahn sons serves as the president and
194
CEO.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2764.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Analyzed from a kairic perspective, Justice Alito’s text first
isolated and then projected an extreme close-up of what he
might characterize as the essential moments. The result was a
necessarily narrow focus on the image of these corporations-asreligious-believers. In Justice Alito’s view, these corporate
characters acquired the sincere religious beliefs of their human
creators. Just as Citizens United found that corporations should
be able to express political views, Justice Alito found that
corporations should be protected in their free exercise of
religion. To support this result, the essential moment in the
chronological timeline (which for these companies covered
between forty-five and fifty years) was not the choice to
incorporate, not the decision to have thousands of employees
and to expand to 500 stores, and not the decision to pay taxes
and to be subject to health and safety regulations. Instead, the
essential moment was the founding of a family business or a
closely held company by a family whose members included
Christian believers. Even in the face of neutral laws of general
applicability, in Justice Alito’s view, these moments of
corporate creation were the only times and places that
counted.195
VII. CONCLUSION
The art of rhetoric seeks to capture in opportune moments
that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which
196
is possible.

As a century of Supreme Court opinions has demonstrated,
kairos helps us capture the opportune and essential moments for
effectively pursuing change. While chronological time equips us
with a sense of movement, measurement, and before-and-after,
chronos renders time as a continuous grid.197 It is only through
our use of kairos that we are able to discern openings and detect
195. Id. at 2767 (noting that “RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for
religious liberty,” and suggesting that there was no reason “to think that the Congress that
enacted such sweeping protection put small-business owners to the choice that HHS
suggests”).
196. Poulakos, supra note 28, at 26.
197. Smith, supra note 6, at 6.
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seasons. Without chronos, we lack the necessary background;
without kairos, we would miss the conflicts and tensions that
lead to discovery, decision, and action.
Critics might conclude that kairos is both relativistic and
opportunistic. Through her understanding of kairos, the writer or
speaker who recognizes the right time and space for a particular
argument may be able to persuade others to adopt a position that
is short-sighted, selfish, and unjust. Yet the concept of kairos
itself suggests a rhetorician’s answer to the resulting dilemma,
though that answer is naturally—perhaps inevitably—not
completely satisfying. Not only must a rhetorical claim be made
at the right time and within the right space, it must also be made
in the right way. In other words, it must fit the setting, including
the audience and the occasion for the argument. These decisions
of timeliness and appropriateness are “artistic elements” that
“cannot by apprehended strictly cognitively and whose
application cannot by learnt mechanically.”198 Instead, they are
“a matter of feeling,”199 a kind of practical wisdom that can only
be learned and tested through experience in the world.200 And, as
truly rhetorical questions, they are always subject to contest and
argument.
Reassuring too is the conclusion that the world’s
happenings “have their own temporal frames and opportune
times quite apart from human action especially the action of this
or that individual.”201 Like the vintner concerned with the right
time to harvest her grapes, the members of the Supreme Court
must depend not only on their own art and technique, including
their sense of kairos, but also on the conditions that make up the
whole of legal rhetoric.202

198. Poulakos, supra note 28, at 29 (footnote omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 29–30.
201. Smith, supra note 6, at 5.
202. See id. (pointing out that “the vintner will be concerned with the ‘right time’ to
harvest the grapes, but, while not meaning to minimize the art and ingenuity of the vintner,
the fact remains that this time will be largely a function of conditions—soil, temperature,
moisture—ingredient in the growing process itself, to say nothing of the organic structure
of the grapes and the time required for their maturation”).

